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INSANITY ACQUITTEES IN THE COMMUNITY: 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND CLINICAL 
CONUNDRUMS 
Michael J. Vitacco* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article will provide an in-depth discussion of legal cases that 
have shaped American policy dealing with individuals found not 
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and deemed fit to return to the 
community.  This Article will discuss several aspects of conditional 
release relevant to the legal community.  Such factors include societal 
attitudes, relevant legal case law, and data-supported outcomes of 
individuals placed back in the community.  In addition, this Article 
will deal with issues related to violence risk assessment and evaluate 
risk assessment effectiveness in determining who may be an 
appropriate candidate for community return.  Contrary to popular 
belief, individuals adjudicated NGRI, even for violent offenses, are 
generally not at high-risk for future violence.  This review will present 
information demonstrating the low recidivism risk by individuals 
adjudicated NGRI and released back to the community.  This Article 
demonstrates the promise of conditional release for insanity 
acquittees from both public safety and fiscally responsible positions.  
This Article summarizes and lays out arguments for continued, and 
potentially even expanded, use of conditional release to properly 
manage insanity acquittees. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 848 
  I.  Insanity Defense Attitudes, Conditional Release, and the 
Law ..................................................................................................... 849 
  II.  Violence Risk Assessment with Insanity Acquittees .................. 856 
                                                                                                                                         
* Ph.D., ABPP Augusta University. 
848 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
  III.  Post-Foucha Issues: Dangerousness, Diagnoses, and 
Commitment ...................................................................................... 861 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 868 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The not guilty by reason of insanity defense (NGRI) remains one 
of the most debated and contested areas of mental health law, replete 
with legal, moral, and political overtones.  The idea that someone can 
commit a crime, even a violent one, and be found non-responsible in 
the eyes of the law, has created a public backlash against the insanity 
defense, including its abolition in four states (Kansas, Montana, 
Idaho, and Utah).1   Despite the unpopularity of the NGRI defense, 
there has been an increasing trend toward discharging insanity 
acquittees from the hospital back to community placements.2  
Although society is often against a return to the community for 
insanity acquittees, it is fiscally and clinically prudent to allow such 
conditional discharges to continue.  These individuals are not simply 
discharged to the community with unfettered access to the 
community.  Instead, insanity acquittees must follow a series of 
conditions in order to maintain their newfound freedoms.  Known as 
conditional release, insanity acquittees typically must remain 
medication compliant, attend specialized therapy, not possess 
weapons, abstain from substance abuse, and, of course, not engage in 
criminal behavior. 
Several landmark cases over the previous twenty-five years have 
paved the way for the development of specialized programs to treat 
and maintain NGRI acquittees in their respective communities.3  
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of 
the Constitutional Implications of Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. 
R.  1509, 1515 (2002); see generally Patricia K. Fox, Commentary: Biases That Affect 
the Decision to Conditionally Release an Insanity Acquittee, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHOL. & L. 337 (2008). 
 2. See Michael J. Vitacco et al., Evaluating Conditional Release in Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity Acquittees: A Prospective Follow-Up Study in Virginia, 38 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 346, 353 (2014). 
 3. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See generally Stephen 
Bieber et al., Predicting Criminal Recidivism of Insanity Acquittees, 11 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 105 (1998) (supporting the need for the treatment of mental illness in 
eliminating violent and nonviolent recidivism); J. Steven Lamberti et al., The Role of 
Probation in Forensic Assertive Community Treatment, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 418 
(2011) (demonstrating how probation agents mandating treatment can play a critical 
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Additionally, many legislatures have acted in accordance with this 
judicial shift through the provision of legal mechanisms for releasing 
individuals adjudicated NGRI back to the community.  This Article 
focuses on substantial areas of conditional release.  Part I unpacks 
attitudes toward the insanity defense and its influence on the 
treatment of insanity acquittees.  This part considers the growing 
trend of allowing insanity acquittees to be returned to their respective 
communities, even in light of substantial misinformation perpetuated 
regarding the relationship between violence and mental illness.  Part 
II provides an overview of violence risk assessment, specifically as it 
relates to potential danger with insanity acquittees and potential 
community placement.  This part outlines limitations of current risk 
assessment methodology for predicting violence and recidivism with 
insanity acquittees in the community on conditional release.  An 
important limitation of violence risk assessments is that most items on 
such risk assessment measures are unrelated to actual conditional 
release outcomes.  Finally, Part III provides summaries of recent data 
related to the success of conditional release across multiple states.  
Such outcomes could provide an impetus for creating empirically-
informed public policies related to the treatment and management of 
insanity acquittees. 
I.  INSANITY DEFENSE ATTITUDES, CONDITIONAL RELEASE, AND 
THE LAW 
The proper way to treat and manage individuals adjudicated NGRI 
remains an evolving area of public policy and the law.  However, even 
before policy-makers and legislatures consider how to best manage 
insanity acquittees, it is important to point to numbers showing the 
general discontentment with the insanity defense as a whole, which is 
often viewed as an abused loophole allowing individuals to avoid 
their just deserts for criminal behavior. 
Several research studies have demonstrated society’s disdain for 
the defense as a whole, and there have even been numerous efforts to 
accurately capture attitudes.  For example, the Insanity Defense 
Attitude-Revised (IDA-R) was developed to evaluate overall 
attitudes toward the defense.4  The authors who designed the study 
                                                                                                                                         
role in ensuring insanity acquittees follow through on court-mandated community-
based treatment). 
 4. See generally Jennifer L. Skeem, et al., Venirepersons Attitudes Toward the 
Insanity Defense: Developing, Refining, and Validating a Scale, 28 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 623 (2004) (demonstrating how insanity defense attitudes can be measured 
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found the scale was underpinned by two factors: (1) orientation 
toward strict liability and (2) concern about perceived injustice and 
danger.5  The authors found general discontent regarding the insanity 
defense among this sample of jurors.6 
In another article, Valerie Hans conducted a survey with 330 
individuals who were recruited using random digit telephone calls in a 
county in Delaware.7  Results of this telephone survey were mixed.  
For instance, 49% of surveyed individuals were in favor of abolishing 
the insanity defense, and almost 95% were in favor of reforming the 
insanity defense.8  Yet, in an unexpected finding, just over three-
fourths of surveyed individuals endorsed that there are times when an 
insanity defense is justified, and 64% endorsed the insanity defense as 
a necessary part of our legal system.9 
Studies looking at characteristics underpinning negative attitudes 
have found that a positive view of capital punishment and 
overestimating the use of the insanity defense are linked to a stronger 
negative attitude toward the defense.10  In discussing what he 
attributed as the “insanity defense problem,” Michael Perlin wrote 
about a very salient issue affecting attitudes toward the insanity 
defense.11  With the use of so-called “designer defenses,” the public 
                                                                                                                                         
and individuals having poor attitudes toward the insanity defense can have real world 
applications; negative attitudes toward the insanity defense reflect beliefs that the 
letter of the law is not being followed in conjunction with the idea that criminally 
insane individuals are being discharged from hospitals and harming society). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally Valerie Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the 
Insanity Defense, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 393 (1986). Given that the study occurred within 
a relatively small area of the United States, the generalizability of such findings are 
certainly open for discussion.  This is especially true since political affiliation may 
play a role in attitudes toward the insanity defense.  See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 396–410. 
 10. Michael J. Vitacco et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense in 
Venirepersons: Refining the IDA-R in the Evaluation of Juror Bias, 8 INT’L J.L. 
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 62 (2009) (presenting similar results from two different 
samples: sample one included 567 university students at a medium-sized college in 
the Midwest; sample two consisted of 239 jurors from a small area in North Carolina); 
Brooke Butler & Adina Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in 
Venireperson’s Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J.L. APPLIED SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. 1744 (2006). 
 11. Michael Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology 
of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5 (1996) 
(regarding the insanity defense, explaining: “Because we continued to do precisely 
what we have done for decades, centuries, and perhaps millennia. We spout 
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has seemingly grown less tolerant of mental health issues, including 
the use of the insanity defense amongst the most seriously and 
persistently mentally ill.  The concerns over faking the insanity 
defense as a legal loophole are now firmly engrained. 
In a thoughtful attempt at overcoming problematic attitudes 
toward the insanity defense, one researcher suggested that a 
flowchart, demonstrating the consequences and “time” completed 
with an insanity defense would ultimately prove useful in the 
reduction of biases.12  As noted in this thesis, the presentation to 
college students of information regarding dispositional outcome had 
an unattended effect: those seeing the information about dispositional 
outcome became harsher in their sentence and less inclined to 
support an insanity finding.13  This paradoxical finding underscores a 
central issue in the field of mental health and the law: How to ensure 
fair consideration of appropriate pleas for mentally ill individuals?  It 
also raises a critical question: If education does not influence juror 
attitudes, what will?  On this front, it appears views regarding the 
insanity defense are very resistant to change.14 
                                                                                                                                         
platitudes, we rectify myths, we create straw men, we talk angrily about insanity 
defense ‘abuse,’ we look longingly to insanity defense ‘abolition’ or ‘reduction’ as 
panaceas  (not simply to the question at hand, but fantastically, as a means of solving 
all contemporary crime problems); we speak scornfully of slick lawyers and deceitful 
experts; we automatically assume that a defendant who raises the insanity defense 
must be faking (although, at least one court opinion and one voter survey reveals-
somewhat remarkably, I thought, that it doesn’t matter if the plea is ‘real’ or ‘faked’; 
our antipathy is almost identical); finally, we deride psychodynamic behavioral 
explanations of ‘crazy’ behavior when it appears ‘obvious’ to one and all that the 
defendant, in fact, ‘did it.’”).   
 12. See Lauren M. Schlumper, Using a Flowchart to Reduce Juror’s Preexisting 
Biases in Cases Utilizing the Insanity Defense (2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Georgia Southern University), http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1442&context=etd [https://perma.cc/LF99-5GWK].  The use, 
and ultimate effectiveness, of such a system remains very much an empirical question.  
As noted in the body of this review, the presentation of the flowchart went against 
the desired result and increased the likelihood a defendant would receive a prison 
sentence. Id.  Certainly, it could be argued the use of university students as your lone 
sample limits the generalizability of these results; however, consistent findings have 
been reported using both samples of undergraduates and venirepersons. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally 
Disordered Behavior: Possible Side Effects of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & 
COMM. PSYCHIATRY 13 (1972).  This article notes that when it comes to issues with 
individuals with mental illness, financial concerns (both of the individual patient and 
of the state) are frequently highlighted, but the high social cost of stigmatization is 
not considered to an appropriate extent. Id.  Likewise, individuals who are released 
from prison after completing their sentence generally return to their respective 
communities with little to no follow-up. Id.  In comparing insanity acquittees to 
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The importance of understanding insanity defense attitudes when 
considering the conditional release of acquittees is evident.  If society 
is opposed to individuals being adjudicated not criminally responsible 
on the basis of their mental illness, their subsequent integration to the 
community would seemingly evoke more problematic responses.  The 
idea that society is opposed to the return of NGRI acquittees is a 
logical downward extension stemming from the strong negative 
attitudes toward the insanity defense.  Yet, specific research has not 
been conducted on attitudes toward the return of insanity acquittees 
to the community.  Moreover, understanding the nature of the 
insanity defense lays critical groundwork for furthering knowledge of 
how conditional release functions. 
The majority of society, based on research regarding the insanity 
defense, does not seem to be unopposed to a return to the days where 
the primary methodology of dealing with NGRI acquittees was by not 
dealing with them at all.  The typical method revolved around placing 
them in long-term forensic hospitals with minimal to no chance of 
release.  Warehousing the mentally ill was the norm for many years, 
until the 1960s when there was a concerted effort to move patients 
from hospitals to the community.  Such warehousing had dire and, 
likely, unintended consequences, including poor mental health 
treatment, higher mortality, and greater victimization, to name a 
few.15  During this time, insanity acquittees were sentenced to 
indeterminate sentences, which generally meant little-to-no chance of 
actual release from the hospital.  Once found not responsible for their 
criminal behavior, these individuals were presumed dangerous and 
were not afforded appropriate due process that would provide an 
avenue for release.  Yet, this area of law remains in flux.   
A variety of legal cases have lit the path for insanity acquittees to 
be released into the community, even though there remain substantial 
challenges from the legal system and a high level of public distrust 
                                                                                                                                         
individuals released from prison, statistically the former are more likely to commit a 
follow-up offense, specifically a violent offense. Id. 
 15. See Joanne Karger, "Don't Tread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. Ex Rel. 
Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for Individuals with Mental 
Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1224–27 (1999); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of 
Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY 
L.J. 375, 380-81 (1982); Kenneth B. Noble, Deciding Consequences of Insanity 
Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/19/week
inreview/deciding-consequences-of-insanity-defense.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/
9X78-U43C]; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (prohibiting the pre-
trial commitment, or warehousing, of those deemed incompetent to stand trial on the 
charges filed against them). 
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regarding mentally ill individuals with criminal records, often with 
multiple crimes, including violent crimes, returning to their home 
communities.  This area of law not only requires a focus on defining 
the limitations to government’s power relative to mandated 
hospitalization, but also delving into the law’s role in conditional 
release decisions requires analysis into legal definitions of mental 
illness and dangerousness. 
Limitations to mandated hospitalization of mentally ill defendants 
with criminal charges began in the 1970s, a decade that witnessed 
substantive challenges to the procedure and duration states used to 
commit individuals, and the rights provided to individuals undergoing 
commitment proceedings.  The 1972 Jackson v. Indiana decision is 
considered a landmark case in competency to proceed to trial 
opinions.16  In reality, the case goes far beyond competency, 
establishing that a state could not indefinitely commit an individual 
on the sole basis of their incompetency to proceed to trial.17  The 
Jackson case emphasized the necessity of treatment for individuals 
deemed not competent to proceed to trial, while at the same time 
curbing rights of the state to hold an individual indefinitely as not 
competent absent of due process.  The Jackson case was limited to 
individuals not competent to proceed to trial, but this case was one of 
the first to deal with the rights of criminal forensic patients. 
The detainment of individuals adjudicated NGRI was taken up in 
Foucha v. Louisiana.18  In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court 
undertook the question of criteria needed to justify the continued 
commitment of Terry Foucha, a man adjudicated NGRI on charges of 
aggravated burglary and illegally discharging a firearm.19  Foucha was 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).  Jackson was deaf and intellectually disabled, 
possessing extreme difficulties in communication. Id. at 717.  The charges brought 
against him were relatively minor and included two counts of petty theft after 
allegedly robbing two women. Id.  Although the crimes themselves were not serious, 
the finding of not competent to proceed was essentially a life sentence for Mr. 
Jackson as there was only a small likelihood he would be released from the state 
psychiatric facility, given the governing legal framework. Id. at 719-20.  The United 
States Supreme Court ruled it was a violation of Mr. Jackson’s Constitutional rights 
to be retained in a psychiatric facility on a finding of incompetency alone. Id. at 731, 
738.  In order to continue to detain Mr. Jackson there would have needed to be a 
finding of dangerousness that would have justified continued hospitalization. Id. at 
733-36. 
 17. Id. at 720. 
 18. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 19. Id. at 73. 
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hospitalized at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana.20  The law in 
Louisiana indicated he would remain hospitalized until he was no 
longer a danger to himself or others, without reference to mental 
illness.21  Foucha was diagnosed with a drug-induced psychosis and 
antisocial personality disorder and denied release by Louisiana due to 
existing dangerousness (he was involved in several fights when 
hospitalized); however, the hospital clinical staff was of the opinion 
that his mental illness had remitted.22  The United States Supreme 
Court ruled, in a 5-to-4 decision, that dangerousness was insufficient 
to retain an NGRI acquittee in the hospital, and that there needed to 
be continued mental illness in order to satisfy the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23  In oft repeated words from Jackson, the Court in 
Foucha stated: 
Due process requires that the nature of commitment bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed . . . .  Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or 
illness.  If he is to be held, he should not be held as a mentally ill 
person.24 
Yet, the decision in Foucha is not without problems.  Despite the 
Court’s guidance, the decision failed to provide an exacting standard, 
so Foucha’s criteria were very pliable by policy- and decision-makers.  
As such, individual states demonstrate the satisfaction of due process 
by showing the nature of the commitment is both reasonable and in 
relation to the purpose of the commitment.  In reaction to Foucha, 
states have developed procedures for the release and management of 
NGRI acquittees.  Although states interpret Foucha differently, the 
continued hospitalization of insanity acquittees is guided by 
determinations of whether the individual remains mentally ill and 
dangerous.25 
While Foucha provided new-found protections, NGRI acquittees 
can nevertheless find themselves in a unique legal category of 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. Id. at 74. 
 21. Id. at 73. 
 22. Id. at 74-75. 
 23. Id. at 86. 
 24. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). 
 25. Vitacco et al., supra note 10, at 1788-1789. See also James W. Ellis, Limits of 
the State’s Power to Confine “Dangerous” Persons: Constitutional Implications of 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 635 (1991) (noting Constitutional 
issues remain regarding the hospitalization and, subsequent release of insanity 
acquittees to supervised placements in the community). 
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presumptive dangerousness, which is often predicated on the basis of 
an insanity finding.26  In Jones v. New York, the United States 
Supreme Court allowed the hospitalization of insanity acquittees for 
crimes, even if those crimes were relatively minor in nature.27  Mr. 
Jones was arrested in 1975 for petty larceny and found NGRI.28  He 
was committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital where a psychologist 
opined Mr. Jones was in need of continued hospitalization as a result 
dangerousness stemming from a diagnosis of “Schizophrenia, 
paranoid type.”29  The Court in Jones made a clear distinction 
between placement in a mental health facility and the nature of the 
crime.30  The Court wrote: 
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's 
view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal 
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation . . . Different considerations underlie 
commitment of an insanity acquittee.  As he was not convicted, he 
may not be punished.  His confinement rests on his continuing 
illness and dangerousness.  Thus, under the District of Columbia 
statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, 
he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he has 
recovered.  In contrast, one who committed a less serious act may be 
confined for a longer period if he remains ill and dangerous.  There 
simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense 
and length of time necessary for recovery.  The length of the 
acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to 
the purposes of his commitment.31 
The Court understood that even individuals who commit minor 
crimes may be potentially dangerous and warrant commitment for the 
purposes of providing mental health treatment in order to reduce the 
likelihood of violence to others or oneself.  As communicated in 
Jones, the mere fact that the insanity acquittee has committed a 
criminal act minimizes the likelihood the individual will be committed 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. However, there has not been significant scholarship devoted to the latency 
between rights granted for civil commitment and a legal decision minimizing the 
state’s power regarding the detainment of individuals adjudicated NGRI. As 
delineated in Jones, the mere presence of overt criminal activity places a higher 
burden on the insanity acquittee to demonstrate they are not a danger to society.  See 
Jones, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 359. 
 29. Id. at 359-60. 
 30. Id. at 370. 
 31. Id. at 369. 
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for “idiosyncratic behavior.”32  The law has been made clear: 
behavior, regardless of how atypical or idiosyncratic, cannot itself 
justify commitment absent dangerousness.33 
II.  VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT WITH INSANITY ACQUITTEES 
Prior to returning to the insanity defense and the Jones decision, it 
is worth reviewing violence prediction in some detail.  One prime 
example is Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University student who killed thirty-two people (twenty-seven 
students and five teachers) and wounded seventeen others in a 
campus shooting on April 16, 2007.34  During his childhood, he was 
isolative, with clear social awkwardness with both adults and peers, 
and was frequently bullied.35  Prior to the shooting, Seung-Hui Cho 
exhibited symptoms consistent with mental illness; these symptoms 
manifested in the following ways: disruptive class behavior, bothering 
and harassing female students (taking pictures of their legs), and 
suicidal ideations.36  These behaviors led to a civil commitment 
hearing where Cho was deemed to pose an imminent danger, but a 
danger that could be managed and treated through outpatient 
treatment.37  The outcome of the commitment hearing and 
subsequent killings resulted in a change to civil commitment 
procedures in the state of Virginia.38 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 367. 
 33. Id.  In a commitment case, idiosyncratic behavior was previously used as a 
justification for civilly committing someone.  At times, civil commitment was used to 
‘put away’ relatives who were engaging in behavior that may be most aptly described 
as embarrassing, but did not constitute a danger to themselves or others. 
 34. N.R. Kleinfeld, Before Deadly Rage, A Life Consumed by a Troubling 
Silence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2p7lQCM [https://perma.cc/
7C8Q-LRLS]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Alison Pfeffer, ‘Imminent Danger’ and Inconsistency: The Need for National 
Reform of the ‘Imminent Danger’ Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 
Wake of the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 291–92 (2008). 
 38. See generally Jane D. Hickey, et al., A New Era Begins: Mental Health Law 
Reform in Virginia, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 101 (2008) (explaining the shooting was 
the impetus for significant changes in the Virginia laws dealing with civil 
commitment; changes were made in five areas of commitment law, including: 
commitment criteria, mandatory outpatient treatment, firearm purchases and 
reporting, privacy disclosures, and procedural changes; maybe the most significant 
change was the $41 million added to the mental health budget to improve treatment 
in an attempt to prevent a similar incident). 
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In conceptualizing how the Virginia Tech and other cases could 
have been prevented, it is imperative to not have hindsight bias and 
think, “we knew it all along.”39  Such thinking is often prevalent after 
a major event.  Obviously, if violent events were predictable they 
could be prevented.  This argument has been a central theme in cases 
dealing with the prediction of violent behavior.  In Barefoot v. 
Estelle, the primary question the Supreme Court considered centered 
on the ability and appropriateness of mental health practitioners to 
predict violent behavior.40  In fact, the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Barefoot, 
advocating the position that mental health practitioners are unreliable 
at predicting violence.41  The amicus brief stated mental health 
practitioners are incorrect more often than they are correct when 
making predictions of violent behavior.42  The Court was not 
persuaded by this argument.43 
In recent arguments, the APA has not advocated for the abolition 
of violence risk assessments, even in death penalty cases.  Instead, the 
APA has supported the use of empirically-based and appropriately 
validated violence risk assessments.  Consider the American 
Psychological Association’s brief for Sherman Lamont Fields.44  As 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. See generally Colleen Cannon & Vernon Quinsey, The Likelihood of Violent 
Behaviour: Predictions, Postdictions, and Hindsight Bias, 27 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. 
SCI./REVUE CANADIENNE DES SCIENCES DU COMPORTMENT 92 (1995) (demonstrating 
how hindsight bias may influence predictions of violence by providing clinicians a 
false sense of confidence in the accuracy of their predictions). 
 40. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).  The decision in Barefoot, although it allowed predictions 
of violent behavior to be made in court, was not an overwhelming endorsement of 
the practice by mental health professionals.  To the contrary, the Court allowed such 
predictions of violence almost as a default. See also Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of 
Mental Health Professionals to “Predict Dangerousness”: A Commentary on 
Interpretation of Dangerousness in the Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1994); 
Jennifer L. Skeem & E. Mulvey, Psychopathy and Community Violence Among Civil 
Psychiatric Patients: Results from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 
69 J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 358 (2001). 
 41. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 5, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-
6080).  
 42. Id. at 4 (“Contrary to the claims of the prosecution psychiatrists who testified 
in this case, psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness, even under 
the best of conditions and on the basis of complete medical data—are of 
fundamentally low reliability.”). 
 43. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901. 
 44. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 11-12, U.S. v. Sherman Lamont Fields, 483 F.3d 
313 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-50393).  In United States v. Fields, the APA submitted an 
amicus brief disagreeing with the methodology of a testifying psychiatrist, Dr. 
Richard Coons, who opined the defendant was likely to be a danger, but he based his 
opinion on inadequate methodology, namely clinical judgment. Id.  Since Barefoot, 
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evidenced over the previous two decades, there have been changes in 
the conceptualization and implementation of violence risk 
evaluations.  Moreover, these changes have led to more confidence in 
the results of risk assessments and greater precision in their use and 
accuracy.45  As such, the use of clinical judgment as a substitute for 
empirically-supported violence risk assessments is inadequate and 
without proper foundation for making such weighty decisions. 
Ultimately, the question of the efficacy of risk assessment with any 
population is an empirically-based question.  With the case of insanity 
acquittees in the community, the answers coming in have not 
provided a bevy of support for the use of full-on, traditional risk-
based measures.  A quick review of extant data raises significant 
questions about the current state of the science regarding predicting 
violence and aggression with mentally disordered offenders, 
specifically individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity and 
conditionally released. 
Currently, the Historical, Clinical, Risk-20, typically referred to as 
the HCR-20, is frequently used in violence risk assessments with 
insanity acquittees.46  In an article by Debbie Green and colleagues, 
                                                                                                                                         
there have been dramatic improvements in violence risk assessments.  As part of the 
iterative process of risk assessment instrument development, the idea of clinical 
judgment for violence prediction has gone by the wayside due to the statistical 
superiority of structured measures. 
 45. There are a variety of instruments designed to predict risk across multiple 
settings and populations.  Multiple studies have demonstrated the superiority of 
structured approaches to non-structured judgments. See generally Michael Doyle & 
Mairead Dolan, Violence Risk Assessment: Combining Structural and Clinical 
Information to Structure Clinical Judgments for the Formulation and Management of 
Risk, 9 J. PSYCHIATRIC MENT. HEALTH NURS. 649 (2002); Jennifer L. Skeem, & John 
Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 338 (2014) (arguing for a transition from violence 
risk assessment to research designed to understand the causes of violence and to use 
information obtained from violence risk assessment to plans to reduce violence); 
Kevin Douglas et al., Violence Risk Assessment: Science and Practice, 4 LEGAL AND 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 149 (1999).  Although there are many controversies in 
the field of mental health law, the area of violence risk assessment is one where there 
is a general consensus on the need to integrate empirically-based factors of violence 
risk.  However, the exact content of violence risk factors has not been agreed upon, 
and likely never will. 
 46. KEVIN DOUGLAS ET AL., BRITISH COLUMBIA: MENTAL HEALTH, LAW, AND 
POLICY INSTITUTE, MANUAL FOR THE HCR-20V3 (2013).  In a recent paper, Kevin 
Douglas supported the belief that the HCR-20 is uniquely positioned to be used with 
conditional release risk assessments because it encompasses many critical items that 
warrant consideration when evaluating whether an individual is suitable for release 
from a forensic hospital. See Kevin Douglas, Version 3 of the Historical-Clinical-Risk 
Management-20 (HCR-20V3): Relevance to Violence Risk Assessment and 
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the authors considered the use of the HCR-20 with 142 individuals 
adjudicated NGRI and released to New York communities over a 
ten-year period.47  The results found very few items from the HCR-20 
associated with conditional release revocation even though one of the 
scales (Historical) demonstrated the ability to differentiate insanity 
acquittees who were not revoked from those who were.48 
Another example considers the state of Virginia, which employs a 
customized risk assessment rating only used in Virginia for evaluating 
NGRI acquittees.49  The specialized instrument, which consists of 
twenty items, mirrors the HCR-20 by considering both historical and 
dynamic risk variables.50  In Virginia, the items related to revocation 
on conditional release were: previous failure on conditional release 
and problematic adherence to hospital treatment.  As such, the 
expediency of the remaining items is questionable in reference to 
generating predictive statements of risk for revocation or violence.  
The results only change minimally when considering time to failure.  
In that case, items considering previous failure on conditional release, 
number of previous violence charges, and number of overall charge 
predicted time to conditional release revocation.51 
An additional study using the HCR-20 is worthy of mention given 
its consistency with other findings here.  In this study, the HCR-20 
was the variable studied in reference to predicting release decisions 
with insanity forensic patients in the state of Georgia.52  Two items 
                                                                                                                                         
Management in Forensic Conditional Release Contexts, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 557 
(2014). 
 47. See Debbie Green et al., Factors Associated with Recommitment of NGRI 
Acquittees to a Forensic Hospital, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 608 (2014). 
 48. Id. (finding the Historical scale was significantly associated with revocation of 
conditional release, but the other two scales were not related to revocation of 
conditional release, raising questions of considering the entire HCR-20 in the 
determination of risk decisions suggesting the use of the other scales to make release 
decisions would be tantamount to adding error into the mix, stating: “Specifically, 
approximately half (47.5%) of those with high scores on the Historical scale were 
recommitted, compared with 15.4% of those with low scores.  Further the Historical 
scale was the only HCR-20 scale associated with recommitment when combined with 
period of transfer.”). 
 49. Vitacco et al., supra note 2. 
 50. Vitacco et al., supra note 2 (finding limited support for the entire measure; 
instead, finding select items were related to revocation or success of conditional 
release; only previous failure on conditional release and problematic adherence to 
hospital treatment were predictive of revocation of conditional release). 
 51. Vitacco et al., supra note 2. 
 52. See Michael Vitacco et al., Projecting Risk: The Importance of the HCR-20 
“Risk” Scale in Predicting Outcomes with Forensic Patients, 34 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 308 
(2016). 
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from the “Risk” scale, a scale designed to predict future problems, 
were associated with outcome.  The two items were Building Stable 
Environments and Reducing Stress, and were predictive of release 
decisions when comparing insanity acquittees who were not allowed 
to be discharged, those discharged and revoked, and those discharged 
who were not returned to the hospital.  Clinicians conducting 
evaluations of conditional release must balance the knowledge that 
structured instruments provide critical data, while acknowledging 
limitations of the instruments, even in light of apparent face validity.53 
In conditional release evaluations, it may be time to consider 
moving beyond current risk assessment measures to more specific, 
specialized risk items relevant to conditional release.  Extant 
literature has identified several factors predictive of revocation of 
conditional release in multiple samples across states.  These studies 
have evaluated data on conditionally released insanity acquittees 
from Louisiana, Maryland, Virginia, and Wisconsin.54  Picking risk 
assessment items and appropriately determining which insanity 
acquittees are best suited for release to the community is of critical 
importance.  In these situations, the success of entire conditional 
release programs is predicated on community-based insanity 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Id.  The Risk scale is designed to prognosticate community-problems and to 
try and design interventions for preventing issues.  One of the keys for successful 
conditional release is the development and implementation of community-based 
programming. 
 54. See generally Vitacco et al., supra note 2; Gina Manguno-Mire et al., What 
Factors Are Related to Success on Conditional Release/Discharge? Findings from 
the New Orleans Forensic Aftercare Clinic: 2002–2013, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 641 
(2014); Daniel Marshall et al., Predicting Voluntary and Involuntary Readmissions to 
Forensic Hospitals by Insanity Acquittees in Maryland, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 627 
(2014); Michael Vitacco et al., Developing Services for Insanity Acquittees 
Conditionally Released into the Community: Maximizing Success and Minimizing 
Recidivism, 5 PSYCHOL. SERVS. 118 (2008).  These studies have identified empirically-
linked factors that correlate with failure on conditional release.  What is noteworthy 
is that many factors linked to failure on conditional release are not listed on formal 
risk assessment measures.  Much of the information gleaned from risk assessment 
instruments is not effective for insanity acquittees on conditional release.  This is 
critical for clinicians to consider.  Instead, several common themes have emerged and 
clinicians conducting risk assessments with insanity acquittees should consider the 
following: previous revocation of conditional release, significant history with 
substance use, presence of antisocial or borderline personality disorder, lack of 
financial resources, and problems complying with treatment.  The goal when 
employing risk assessment is not simply to predict violence.  Instead, the goal with 
this population is the development of risk management plans designed to successfully 
manage the NGRI acquittee in the community and protect the public. 
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acquittees not committing significant acts of violence.55  Part III 
provides specific information on how well current programs do in 
maintaining conditionally released individuals in the community. 
III.  POST-FOUCHA ISSUES: DANGEROUSNESS, DIAGNOSES, AND 
COMMITMENT 
Beginning with the landmark case of Foucha v. Louisiana, states 
have used conditional release to manage insanity acquittees as well as 
to manage budgets.56  When done effectively, conditional release 
programs save a significant amount of money for already stretched 
state mental health budgets.57  As described earlier, the decision in 
Foucha provided a pathway for states to set criteria for the release of 
insanity acquittees.  These issues would appear relatively straight-
forward.  For instance, does the individual continue to have a mental 
illness that results in dangerousness?58  However, this decision is far 
from straightforward, and has frequently led to confusion, both for 
clinicians and attorneys alike.  As discussed below, the courts have 
often decided cases in a manner clouding the diagnostic criteria 
relevant for conditional release decisions. 
Conditional release programs in their various forms have legal 
precedent in both state and federal systems, but the manner in which 
states determine to operate them can be vastly different.59  As a 
result, states have developed unique plans for how to implement 
conditional release.  Critical to the argument are temporal issues 
regarding dangerousness.  For instance, insanity is focused on the 
defendant’s mental state during the time of the offense; however, in 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. Vitacco et al., supra note 52.  Vitacco and colleagues (2008) underscored the 
importance of appropriate follow-up care, including housing.  In fact, not having 
appropriate follow-up services may prove to be a valid risk factor predicting which 
individuals on conditional release may not ultimately be successful.  It may also be 
possible that this potential risk factor should be utilized to determine who is a viable 
candidate for conditional release from a forensic hospital.  More research is needed 
on this topic and evaluating the importance of specific dynamic variables related to 
successful community reintegration. 
 56. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 57. See Ilan Melnick, Passageway: A Novel Approach to Conditional Release, 34 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 396 (2016) (describing how a conditional release effectively is cost-
saving for the state of Florida). 
 58. DEBRA PINALS & DOUGLAS MOSSMAN, EVALUATION FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT 
(Oxford University Press 2012) (providing a history and current state of commitment 
standards throughout the United States). 
 59. Patricia Griffin et al., Designing Conditional Release System for Insanity 
Acquittees, 18 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 231–41 (1991). 
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conditional release the focal issue centers on the acquittee’s current 
mental status and dangerousness.  Yet, in making this temporal 
distinction, some courts have allowed consideration of remote 
violence in the prediction of future violence when considering 
conditional release.  As in Jones, once an insanity acquittee is 
committed he or she has the burden to prove that he or she is no 
longer dangerous.60  In federal law, on the basis of the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act, insanity acquittees have the burden of proof to 
show by clear and convincing evidence their release would not cause a 
risk.61  In insanity release cases, “dangerousness” is an elusive, ill-
defined construct that can vary significantly across jurisdictions.  
Along similar lines, the notion of mental illness in these cases is 
ambiguously defined and agreement regarding diagnoses between 
professionals remains elusive.62  It should be noted, however, that 
most states have statutory definitions of mental illness.63  For 
instance, one only needs to consider the Miller case to understand 
that courts can rely on almost any diagnosis to justify continued 
commitment for an insanity acquittee and rely on even obscure 
evidence of dangerousness.64 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 61. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2012) (“In a hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of 
this section, a person found not guilty only by reason of insanity of an offense 
involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another person, or 
involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another due to a 
present mental disease or defect.  With respect to any other offense, the person has 
the burden of such proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 62. PINALS & MOSSMAN, supra note 58, at 76–77 (indicating modest kappas for 
major diagnoses and also underscoring that unlike other medical decisions, the 
decisions on psychiatric diagnoses “usually depends entirely on clinicians’ 
observations and patients’ reports about their experiences”). 
 63. For example, in Georgia, the state in which this author primarily practices, 
mental illness is defined by the following, found in O.C.G.A. 17-7-131 (2010): 
“‘Mentally ill’ means having a disorder of thought or mood which significantly 
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the 
ordinary demands of life.  However, the term ‘mental illness’ shall not include a 
mental state manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.” 
 64. State v. Miller, 933 P.2d 606, 616 (Haw.1997).  Miller argued before the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii that he was inappropriately denied conditional release. Id. 
at 609.  The court rejected Miller’s arguments for release and made several critical 
statements relevant to conditional release in Hawaii, specifically as conditional 
release relates to dangerousness and mental illness.  The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
ruled: “First, we see no problem with the circuit court considering the insanity 
acquittee’s past misconduct in determining whether the insanity acquittee is still 
suffering from a mental illness.  The court has discretion to consider all relevant 
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In Miller, a court-appointed psychologist testified that Miller 
suffered from sexual sadism, antisocial personality disorder, and 
psychoactive substance abuse and, therefore, met criteria for both 
mental illness and dangerousness.65  Many mental health 
professionals would not consider these diagnoses to reflect the 
statutory definitions of mental illness or reflective of serious and 
persistent mental illness, but instead indicative of character 
pathology.  Similar findings have been made in other jurisdictions, 
that courts have shown the propensity to rely on diagnoses to justify 
continued commitment, including diagnoses that would likely not 
qualify an individual for an insanity defense in the first place.  In State 
v. Klein, the Washington Supreme Court ruled diagnoses of 
polysubstance dependence and personality disorder, not otherwise 
specified, were sufficient for the purpose of continued confinement in 
a state mental health facility, as long as they bore some reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which Klein was committed.66  The 
Supreme Court of Georgia made a similar ruling regarding a 
diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder.67  In Dupree v. 
Schwarzkophf, despite testimony from a clinical psychologist opining 
a patient’s schizoaffective disorder was in remission, the court ruled in 
                                                                                                                                         
evidence, including expert testimony, the insanity acquittee’s misconduct, and 
observations of the insanity acquittee, in determining whether the insanity acquittee 
is legally insane.” Id. at 615.  The court went on to state: “The focal point of the 
release proceeding is not on past acts, but on current diagnosis of a present mental 
illness, disease or disorder that renders the person dangerousness.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 616. 
 66. State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644 (Wash. 2005).  In this case, the Washington 
Supreme Court ruled on the continued confinement of Tina Klein, who stabbed her 
twenty-month old nephew with a butcher knife. Id. at 646.  The child survived and 
Ms. Klein was found not guilty by reason of insanity, granted conditional release, and 
ultimately remanded to Western State Hospital in Tacoma, Washington for repeated 
violation of the terms of her release. Id.  Ms. Klein petitioned the court for full 
release on the basis she no longer suffered from a mental disorder. Id. at 647.  In a 6-3 
decision, the Washington Supreme Court ruled an insanity acquittee was not required 
to have the same diagnoses that formed the basis for the plea. Id. at 654.  The court 
ruled that Ms. Klein “presented a substantial danger to others or a substantial 
likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety.” Id.  The dissent 
was noteworthy as it embraced a more traditional definition of mental illness in 
stating substance abuse is not a mental disorder, and it is more in-line with an 
addiction. Id. at 654-58 (Sanders, J., dissenting).  As such, the dissent believed Ms. 
Klein should have been granted release. Id. 
 67. See Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, No. S11A0290, 2011 WL 2519534 (Ga. 2011), 
vacated as moot by Dupree v. Schwarzkophf, 745 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 2011).  The court 
vacated the opinion because Dupree obtained release prior to the court’s ruling on 
his habeas appeal. Dupree, 745 S.E.2d at 279.  The reasoning contained within the 
vacated opinion illuminates the state judiciary’s stance on this issue. 
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favor of Dupree’s continued confinement in a state mental health 
facility because he also had antisocial personality disorder.68  In 
Dupree, the psychologist also testified that Dupree “did not present 
an imminent risk of harm to [himself] or others.”69  Despite this, the 
court ruled the continued diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder 
did indeed qualify Dupree for continued commitment and 
hospitalization.70 
Other states have yet to document the need for a clear link 
between mental illness and dangerousness.  For instance in the case of 
State v. Huss, the Iowa Supreme Court focused their decision to 
remand the case back to the district court on the need for a finding of 
continued dangerousness, without considering Huss’s continued 
mental illness as a factor.71 
The final area of law regarding post-commitment issues is the 
manner in which the court would interpret a breach of conditional 
release that could lead to revocation.  Similar to conceptualization of 
dangerousness and potential diagnoses eligible for continued 
commitment under NGRI, there have been differing responses to 
what would warrant a revocation of conditional release and mandate 
the NGRI acquittee to return to the hospital or other secure setting.  
One only needs to consider the cases presented in this Article to 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. See Dupree, 2011 WL 2519534. 
 69. Id.. 
 70. Id.. (stating that Dupree’s personality disorders qualify as mental illnesses as 
defined by OCGA § 37-1-1 (12), which defines mental illness as a “disorder of 
thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to 
recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.”). 
 71. See State v. Huss, 666 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 2003).  In State v. Huss, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa focused on a conditional release of Loren Huss, who was found not 
guilty by reason of insanity for the murder of his girlfriend. Id. at 155.  He was 
diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder. Id. at 155-56.  The district court found Mr. Huss met criteria for continued 
commitment despite reports from a psychiatrist working with Mr. Huss who opined 
that he was no longer mentally ill or dangerous. Id. at 155.  The Iowa Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case back to the district court after finding Mr. Huss 
remained mentally ill, but was not currently dangerous. Id. at 162-63.  Huss had a 
significant history of violent behavior toward women, and the murder of his girlfriend 
was particularly heinous.  In determining the definition of dangerousness for Huss, 
the court relied on an earlier ruling where they said the following: “[t]o confine a 
citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, it must be 
shown that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger 
was manifested by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to himself or 
to another.” Id. at 155, 162.  Based on the lack of substantial findings to support the 
finding of dangerousness, the Supreme Court of Iowa mandated Huss’ release absent 
a finding of dangerousness. Id. at 163. 
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understand how various courts may differ on what constitutes a 
mental illness for the sake of continued inpatient treatment with an 
NGRI acquittee.  Of course, any new criminal behavior could lead to 
a return to a hospital or even to prison time. 
Yet, how violations are conceptualized and handled can be done 
quite differently across jurisdictions.  Two cases focusing on the 
revocation of conditional release exemplify the inexact nature of the 
manner in which insanity acquittees can be revoked or allowed to 
remain in the community.  In the United States v. Crape, the 
Eleventh Circuit allowed Mr. Crape to remain in the community 
despite behavior that in most jurisdictions would have led to a 
significant restriction or a loss of liberty.72  In this ruling, the Eleventh 
Circuit appears to have diminished the influence of potentially 
dangerous behavior as a condition of release.  In a later case, United 
States v. Washington, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
violating court-ordered treatment was sufficient for ordering the 
insanity acquittee to return to an inpatient facility and his continued 
release constituted a danger to society.73  Notably, the Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. See United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010).  In this case, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered the case of Mr. Michael Crape, who was arrested and 
charged after writing threatening letters to President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney. Id. at 1239-40.  Mr. Crape was found NGRI. Id.  After being committed to a 
treatment facility, then conditionally discharged, Mr. Crape began writing 
threatening letters again, which led to the revocation of his conditional release. Id. at 
1240.  Mr. Crape appealed and the court of appeals ruled in his favor because writing 
threatening letters was not considered to indicate noncompliance with treatment. Id. 
at 1247.  The court agreed Mr. Crape’s behavior may have been illegal and could 
have led to his arrest, but did not warrant a revocation of his conditional release. Id. 
See also Kavya Singareddy & Reena Kapoor, Conditional Release of Insanity 
Acquittees, 40 J. AM ACAD. PSYCH & L. 141 (2012) (discussing the Crape ruling and 
noting that the case raises significant questions about how to manage insanity 
acquittees in the community who are treatment compliant, yet engage in potentially 
dangerous behavior.  In this case the behavior may be considered more salient given 
that it is behavior consistent with acts leading him to be found NGRI.) 
 73. See United States v. Washington, 764 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2014).  The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that Mr. Marvin Goodlow Washington could have his conditional 
release revoked after being evicted from a group home, which was part of his 
prescribed, court-ordered mental health treatment. Id. at 498-99.  Mr. Washington 
was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of bank robbery. Id. at 482.  
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that placement in a group home did not 
constitute treatment. Id.  Furthermore, the court ruled Mr. Washington’s continued 
release would represent a substantial risk to the public. Id. at 496.  As a result, Mr. 
Washington’s conditional release was revoked. Id. at 500.  The court’s decision 
emphasized that Mr. Washington’s placement was codified in his treatment plan, and 
therefore his eviction was a clear violation. Id. at 497-99. 
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considered Crape in their decision in Washington, but ultimately 
rejected that reasoning.74 
One such lesson to be gleaned from these decisions is that 
conditional release providers should be highly specific in their 
treatment plans regarding what behavior could warrant revocation.  
Conditional release plans should include specific management plans, 
including living arrangements and rules and regulations that must be 
followed.  
In considering changes to the law and its application in conditional 
release programs, it is not surprising that states and the federal 
government have relied on conditional release to manage insanity 
acquittees who no longer pose a danger to society.  Data from 
insanity acquittees in Virginia, shows that a well-managed program 
leads to high levels of success,75 which is often the result of specialized 
housing services and intense community management.76  The data 
presented in this brief section shows the overall success of state-wide 
programs in providing intensive case management and supervision 
services.  I primarily focus on data from three states: Wisconsin, 
Virginia, and Maryland.77  These three diverse states have remarkable 
similarities.  In addition, results from New York,78 are also discussed 
in this section to enable the reader to evaluate conditional release 
programs. 
This author and colleagues evaluated the files of 363 insanity 
acquittees on conditional release in the state of Wisconsin who were, 
with comprehensive plans, being monitored in community-based 
settings.79  The large majority of the sample maintained their release 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. Washington, 764 F.3d at 498 (“[R]eliance on Crape is misplaced because, 
unlike the ancillary requirement imposed by the court in Crape, the residence 
requirement here was a component of Washington’s physician-prescribed regimen.”). 
 75. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2. 
 76. Marshall et al., supra note 54.  The Marshall et al. (2014) study reported that 
195 individuals out of a total of 356 were readmitted to hospitals.  However, the large 
majority of these folks were never revoked.  If programs work, hospitals are available 
for medication adjustments, which actually serve to decrease overall revocations. 
 77. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2. 
 78. See Green et al., supra note 47. 
 79. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52.  This sample included every individual 
released during an extended period in the state of Wisconsin.  The article focused on 
two primary aspects of conditional release.  First, factors relevant to revocation of 
release.  The second aspect focused on the overall success of the conditionally release 
program.  The study found high success rates for individuals on conditional release.  
Most notable was the extremely low rate of new criminal behavior, and even lower 
rate of violent behavior.  The sample itself had a significant amount of criminal 
behavior leading to the insanity plea.  Specifically, 53.1% of the sample was arrested 
 
2016] INSANITY ACQUITTEES  867 
for the full time of follow-up.80  Moreover, if conditional release 
works as it is expected, individuals are brought back into a secure 
mental health setting before they decompensate back to manifesting 
significant mental health issues.  As evidenced in this study, consistent 
monitoring can take a group that is at a high risk for violence, based 
on their history, and minimize risk.  Certainly, this has both public 
health and public policy implications. 
Another state-wide study on conditional release was conducted in 
Virginia.81  The results of the Virginia study, which included 127 
insanity acquittees, mirrored the study in Wisconsin in several 
remarkable ways, including the behaviors leading to revocation.  
Another state-wide database was obtained from Maryland and 
consisted of 356 individuals on conditional release who were followed 
for three years.82  Results were consistent with those from other 
jurisdictions regarding factors related to revocation, but underscored 
the overall success of a conditional release program in maintaining 
individuals in the community.  A state-wide study from Maryland also 
demonstrated the availability of appropriate community-based 
mental health treatment and its impact on minimizing problems with 
insanity acquittees.83 
Other research has generated similar results, especially concerning 
low recidivism and showing the success of community-based 
monitoring.84   To be successful, programs must appropriately use 
                                                                                                                                         
for a violent offense and 10.5% of the sample had a sexually-based offense.  Of the 
total sample of 362 individuals on conditional release, 240 individuals maintained 
their release during the entire follow-up period.  Of the 123 individuals revoked, only 
7.11% committed a new crime and only 3.68% were revoked for a violent offense, 
none of which were homicides. 
 80. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52, at 121. 
 81. See Vitacco et al., supra note 2, at 348. 
 82. See Marshall et al., supra note 54. 
 83. See Vitacco et al., supra note 52.  Out of the entire sample of 356 insanity 
acquittees on conditional release the overall recidivism rate was 14%.  When 
comparing this number with prisoners from the state of Maryland, the overall 
recidivism percentage for insanity acquittees is much lower than individuals released 
from prison in the state of Maryland, which stood at approximately 40%. See Justin 
George, Ex-Offenders Less Likely to Return to Prison, Maryland Officials Say, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 30, 2013 at A1. 
 84. Gina Manguno-Mire et al., What Factors are Related to Success on 
Conditional Release/Discharge? Findings from the New Orleans Forensic Aftercare 
Clinic: 2002–2013, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 641–58 (2014).  In this ten-year study, over 
70% of individuals maintained their conditional release.  Just five individuals had 
their release revoked as a result of new charges.  Another research study 
underscoring that conditional release programs, when monitoring is done correctly, 
are successful.  In contrast to the Crape decision, these results show the necessity of 
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clinical recommendations for each individual even if the specifics of 
follow-up care are difficult to implement in practice.85  Some of these 
difficulties appear to stem from evaluator disagreement.86 
CONCLUSION 
Policy and mental health decision-makers should strongly consider 
the positive evidence available regarding the success of conditional 
release programs.  Relying on empirical studies as a foundation for 
conditional release programs is a positive alternative to allowing fear-
based perceptions of mental illness to guide policy decisions.  As 
demonstrated by multiple empirical studies across states, the efficacy 
of these intensive programs that monitor and ensure treatment 
compliance with insanity acquittees result in a successful return to the 
community.  Once treated, most individuals with mental illness do not 
commit other crimes, and returns to the hospital are the result of 
violations of release and not criminal recidivism.  Generating new 
discussion and developing informed policy should be at the forefront 
of future discussions on the best practices for successfully managing 
insanity acquittees.  It is hoped that this Article serves as just one step 
in the process of implementing empirically-informed public policy 
with insanity acquittees released into the community.  Although 
weaknesses remain in how decision-making for forensic patients 
leaving the hospital is completed, such results do not detract from the 
success of conditional release programs.  But the bigger question 
remains: Can conditional release programs be improved upon and 
developed enough to generate even lower rates of recidivism and 
revocations?  The answer appears to be yes. 
                                                                                                                                         
taking rule violations seriously with the goal of minimizing actual criminal recidivism.  
Based on the link between mental illness and criminal behavior in this select group of 
individuals it is imperative to minimize psychiatric decompensation. 
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